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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 940367-CA

v.
RUSSELL CATALANO,
Defendant/Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-4-11 (1994), and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the lower court erred in concluding the state had carried its burden of proof

after the court found there was no evidence independent of the defendant's confession to
establish that the driver had left the scene of the accident?
This issue should be reviewed under a "correction of error" standard. State v.
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Haves. 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App.
1993).
This issue was originally raised at trial in January of 1992 (R. 193 at 51-55). It was
raised again at the hearing held on remand from this court in January of 1994 (R. 259).
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-29 (1988)
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or
death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immediately return to and
remain at the scene until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 41-6-31.
The stop may not obstruct traffic more than is necessary.
(2) A person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1) is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Annotated § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1991)
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked
under this chapter and operated any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as
provided in this section.
(2) A person convicted of violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation specified
in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(3)(a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a vehicle while his license is suspended or
revoked for:
(i)
a refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January 30, 1992, of leaving
the scene of an injury accident, a Class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated
Section 41-6-29, and driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-136 (R. 193). At trial, Mr. Hansen moved for a
dismissal of both counts arguing that the State had not met its burden by establishing the
corpus delicti by independent, clear and convincing evidence before admitting Mr. Hansen's
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confession that he was the vehicle's driver at the time of the accident (R. 193 at 51-55). The
court denied Mr. Hansen's motion to dismiss (Id.).
On March 26, 1992, Mr. Hansen appeared for sentencing, and the court sentenced
him in an unsigned order. On May 6, 1992, the court held a hearing to review the sentence
and stayed the sentence for thirty days pending the perfection of an appeal by Mr. Hansen.
A notice of appeal was filed by Mr. Hansen on May 8, 1992 (R. 110); however, because the
unsigned order did not constitute a final order, the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on September 15, 1992 (R. 113-114).
A second notice of appeal was filed on November 9, 1992 (R. 122). On August 4,
1993, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions that explicit findings of
fact and conclusions of law be made as to whether the corpus delicti rule was properly
applid. State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1993) (R. 196-198).
A remand hearing (oral arguments) took place on January 5, 1994, before the
Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, Fourth District Circuit Court, where Mr. Hansen's previous
convictions were confirmed (R. 259). On January 11, 1994, Mr. Hansen made a motion to
reconsider (R. 206-208). A sentencing hearing was held on January 19, 1994, where Mr.
Hansen's motion to reconsider was denied and his sentence was stayed pending the perfection
of an appeal (R. 286).
On February 16, 1994, Mr. Hansen filed a notice of appeal with the Utah Court of
Appeals (R. 213). However, on May 3, 1994, that appeal was dismissed for lack of a signed
final order (R. 286-87, 299-300). On or about June 9, 1994 a signed order by Judge Dimick
containing findings of fact and conclusions of law confirming Mr. Hansen's guilt was filed
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(R. 306-307); and on or about June 14, 1994, a notice of appeal was again filed by Mr.
Hansen with the Utah Court of Appeals (R.309-310) challenging that conclusion of law.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January 30, 1992, of leaving
the scene of an injury accident and driving with a suspended license (R. 193). Independent
of Mr. Hansen's confession, evidence presented by the state showed a single car rollover
occurred on 1-15 North on September 7, 1991. The car came to rest on the passenger side
of the car, and the only available exit from the car was the driver's door. An unidentified
man in a blue jacket and red shirt was seen climbing up and out of that door, though no
witnesses could testify as to whether the man was the driver or the passenger. This same
man went to a nearby grove of trees, then recrossed the highway and hitchhiked north.
There was a second occupant in the car at the time of the accident who was thrown from the
vehicle, pinned under it, and received mortal injuries to the head. State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d
978, 979 (Utah App. 1993).
Approximately twenty-five hours later police arrested David Laird Hansen who was
wearing clothes similar to those described by witnesses on the previous day. (R. 193 at 4247). Mr. Hansen was a passenger in a car traveling on 1-15 when he was arrested the day
after the accident. (R. 193 at 48.) During subsequent questioning by police, Mr. Hansen
stated that he had been driving the car at the time of the accident. (R. 193 at 43).
Based on the foregoing facts, Mr. Hansen was convicted of leaving the scene of an
accident and driving with a suspended license.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding the state had carried its burden of proof and Mr.
Hansen was guilty as charged. In order to find Mr. Hansen guilty of 1) leaving the scene of
an injury accident and 2) driving with a suspended license, the state must first prove the
corpus delicti of each crime. The corpus delicti may only be proved with evidence
independent of the defendant's admission. Once the corpus delicti has been established, then
the defendant's statements may be introduced as evidence.
On the charge of leaving the injury accident, the state must prove by independent
evidence that the driver and not the passenger left the scene of the accident. Only then can
Mr. Hansen's statements be used to prove he was the driver. Upon remand from the Court
of Appeals, the trial court found the independent evidence was inconclusive as to whether the
driver left the scene. Therefore the corpus delicti could not be established. Despite this
finding the trial court ruled Mr. Hansen was guilty of both crimes. This conclusion of law is
in direct opposition to the findings of fact and the holdings of the Court of Appeals. It
should be reversed under a correction of error standard.
Mr. Hansen's second conviction for driving with a suspended license should be
vacated for the same reasons. In order to prove this crime, the state must first show by
independent evidence that the operator of the vehicle had a suspended license. The state has
only demonstrated that Mr. Hansen's license was suspended, not that the driver of the
vehicle had a suspended license. Thus the state has not carried its burden. Because the
corpus delicti of this crime has not been established, this conviction should also be vacated.
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The correction of error standard is the proper standard of review for challenging
conclusions of law in a criminal case. In applying this to the trial court's erroneous
conclusion of law, this court should review the findings of fact and reverse the trial court's
decision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE STATE HAD CARRIED ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF AFTER THE COURT FOUND THER WAS NO EVIDENCE
INDEPENDENT OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION TO ESTABLISH THE
DRIVER HAD LEFT THE ACCIDENT SCENE
A.

THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE MUST BE SATISFIED BEFORE MR. HANSEN'S ADMISSION IS
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE

Corpus Delicti is the objective proof that a crime has been committed. In this case,
Mr. Hansen was charged with leaving the scene of an injury accident and driving with a
suspended driver's license. The state must establish corpus delicti or proof of these two
crimes by clear and convincing evidence, independent of the defendent's confession. If the
state establishes corpus delicti, then the defendant's confession may be introduced in court.
This rule has recently been restated and clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in State
v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Knoefler. 563 P.2d 175, 176
(Utah 1977)): "Corpus delicti must be established through evidence, independent of the
confession or admission, that the 'injury specified . . . occurred, and that such injury was
caused by someone's criminal conduct.'" After a review of Utah's corpus delicti case law,
the court went on to find that the requirement of clear and convincing evidence for corpus
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delicti in State v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954) was still followed by the court. Johnson,
821 P.2dat 1163.
Thus, the Johnson rule places three requirements on the state for establishing the
corpus delicti of the crime:
1)

The state must prove the occurrence of a crime, wrong, or injury;

2)

The state must prove the crime, wrong, or injury was caused by
someone's criminal conduct; and

3)

The evidence must be clear and convincing, and independent of the
defendant's confession.

The state did not meet these requirements at trial.

B.

IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE, THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE
CONVINCED BY INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DRIVER LEFT THE SCENE OF THE
ACCIDENT

Mr. Hansen was charged with leaving the scene of an injury accident. To find him
guilty of the crime, the state must show that the driver left the scene of the accident. It is
not a crime for a passenger involved in an injury accident to leave the accident scene. The
crime occurs when the operator of the car leaves the scene. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29
(1988). Therefore, in order to prove the occurrence of a crime, wrong, or injury as defined
by Johnson, the state must provide clear and convincing evidence that the person who left the
scene was the driver of the vehicle and not a passenger. To prove the driver left the scene,
the state may only use evidence independent of the defendant's admission.
After proving the driver left the accident scene, the corpus delicti of the crime has
been established. To find Mr. Hansen guilty of the alleged crimes, the state must then show
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that the driver of the car was Mr. Hansen. The state may use Mr. Hansen's admission to
prove this fact, but not before the corpus delicti has been established.1
The corpus delicti rule is a "safeguard against convicting the innocent on the strength
of a false confession." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 (quoting State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353,
357 (Utah 1957)). If a crime can be established only on the basis of the defendant's
statements, there is too great a chance for abuse in the system. There must be sufficient
evidence, independent of the defendant's statements, to prove the crime.
In Mr. Hansen's first appeal this court declared:
In order for the State to establish the corpus delicti of the crime specified in
section 41-6-29, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the person who left the scene was in fact the driver of the vehicle and not
merely a passenger. Such evidence may not include defendant's admission that
he was driving.
Hansen, 857 P.2d at 980 (emphasis added). In reviewing the trial court's first decision, this
court found there were ambiguous references to Mr. Hansen's admission, giving the
appearance that the "trial court may have improperly used defendant's admission to find that
the person who left the scene was the driver of the car." Id. at 981. The Court of Appeals
concluded, "If this is the case, the trial court incorrectly applied the corpus delicti rule." IcL

*In State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 980 (Utah App. 1993), this court made a clear
distinction between finding the driver had left the scene of the accident and finding the
defendant was the driver at the time of the accident. The first finding must be demonstrated
in order to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The latter determination need not be
proven to establish the corpus delicti. "The question considered when establishing corpus
delicti is whether a crime was in fact committed, not who committed the crime, (citations
omitted) The question of who actually committed the crime may be answered by the
defendant's admission once the corpus delicti is established." IcL; State v. Knoefler,
563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977).
8

Due to the inadequacy of the trial court's findings, the matter was remanded for "an
explicit determination of whether the corpus delicti of the crime ha[d] been properly
established without resort to defendant's admission." Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981.

C.

ON REMAND, THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME
COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION

Upon remanding the matter to the trial court, this court stated the conviction should
be vacated if the trial court did not find the corpus delicti of the crime had been properly
established without using Mr. Hansen's admission. Hansen, 847 P.2d at 981. This
instruction was not followed by the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Order, dated June 9, 1994,
the trial court found:
3)

4)

The state has established that an unknown person exited the vehicle involved in
the accident and fled. (Transcript of hearing p. 34. hereinafter T) (emphasis
added).
That if there is evidence from any source to establish that the person
who exited the vehicle is the driver, then the corpus of the crime is
established. (T. p. 34 lines 5-8).

(R. at 306-07). The Court of Appeals stated the corpus delicti rule was satisfied if the trial
court was convinced it was the driver who left the scene, not an unknown person. In
addition, the Court of Appeals ruled the evidence could not come from Mr. Hansen's
admission. The term "any source" seems to imply the inclusion of the admission, but corpus
delicti must be established before the admission is allowed into court.
The trial court further found:
5)

The confession of the defendant establishes that he is the driver. (T. p.
34 lines 8-9).
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6)

The court finds that independent of defendants [sic] confession the
record is silent on identity. (T. p. 34, line 25 and p. 22 line 10-12, p.
23 line 20-22, p. 24).

(R. at 306). These findings do not reach the question of whether the driver left the scene of
the accident. The driver's identity is not an element of the corpus delicti.
Most importantly the court stated:
7)

The court finds that independent of the defendant's confession the
record is inconclusive on the issue of whether the deceased was the
driver of the vehicle or the person who left the accident was the driver
of the vehicle. (T. p. 24, lines 2-6, p. 23, lines 20-24, p. 30, lines 34).

(R. at 306.) Although the finding of fact is not phrased in the exact manner requested by the
Court of Appeals (i.e. the court finds that independent of the defendant's confession the
record is inconclusive on the issue of whether the driver of the vehicle left the accident), it is
clear the trial court was unable to determine if the driver of the vehicle was the person seen
leaving the scene of the accident. Thus, without Mr. Hansen's admission, the state did not
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person who left the scene was the driver
and not the passenger. Without this proof, the corpus delicti rule is not satisfied. Without
proper establishment of corpus delicti, the conviction must be overturned.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW DOES NOT CORRECTLY FOLLOW ITS
FINDINGS OF FACT

Upon the findings mentioned above, the trial court gave its conclusion of law as
follows: "The Court concludes that with the evidence presented along with the confession of
the defendant, the state has carried its burden of proof. Therefore the Court finds the
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defendant guilty as charged." This conclusion does not logically follow from the findings of
fact.
In Mr. Hansen's earlier appeal, this court stated what the trial court should conclude
based on its findings:
We therefore remand the matter for an explicit determination of whether the
corpus delicti of the crime has been properly established without resort to
defendant's admission. If the trial court so finds, the conviction may stand. If
not, the conviction should be vacated.
Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. The trial court found that without Mr. Hansen's confession the
record was inconclusive concerning the identity of the person who left the scene of the
accident. The driver was as likely to be the deceased as the person who walked away.
Without proof that the driver left the accident, the corpus delict rule was not satisfied, and
Mr. Hansen's confession should not have been brought before the court. Accordingly, the
burden of proof was not met by the state and the conviction should be overturned.

E.

WITHOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI, THE SECOND CONVICTION
MUST ALSO BE VACATED

Mr. Hansen was further convicted of driving with a suspended license. The
applicable crime specified under Utah Code Annotated § 41-2-136 occurs when a person
whose license has been suspended operates a motor vehicle upon Utah highways while the
license is suspended. It is not a crime for a person with a suspended license to be a
passenger in a car. Thus the state must show that the driver of the vehicle in this case had a
suspended license. This must be shown by independent evidence. Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981.
Only after the state establishes the corpus delicti can Mr. Hansen's admission be used to
show that he was the driver of the vehicle.
11

There are several ways the state could have shown through independent evidence that
the driver of the vehicle had a suspended license. If the state had established both occupants
in the car had suspended licenses, the state would have proved the driver, as one of the
occupants, was committing a crime. If the state had given independent evidence from a
police officer who observed Mr. Hansen driving, the state would have established the corpus
delicti.2 If the state's witnesses had identified Mr. Hansen as the vehicle driver, this would
also have provided the independent evidence needed to verify the crime. The state has done
none of these things. Instead the state contends that Mr. Hansen's admission establishing his
identity in the first conviction may be used for the second conviction.
It is true that once the corpus delicti has been independently established for a criminal
charge and a defendent's admission is allowed into evidence, the admission may then be used
to establish the corpus delicti of another crime involving the defendant in the same action.
Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. However, in this case, the state has not established the corpus
delicti of the first charge. Mr. Hansen's admission is not allowed as evidence unless the
state can establish the driver left the scene of the accident. Because the state did not carry
this burden of proof, Mr. Hansen's admission may not be used as evidence in the second
charge of driving with a suspended license.
The court can only admit Mr. Hansen's statements if the state proves through
independent evidence that either the driver left the injury accident or the driver was operating
the vehicle with a suspended license. The state has not been able to establish the corpus
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The suspension of Mr. Hansen's license has been established by independent evidence
and is not in question.
12

delicti of either of these crimes through independent evidence. Accordingly, Mr. Hansens's
statements may not be used and the convictions must be vacated.
In Mr. Hansen's first appeal, this court remanded with "instructions that explicit
findings of fact and conclusions of law be made as to whether the State has independently
established the corpus delicti of both crimes." Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. The trial court
made no findings concerning whether the driver had a suspended license, and as stated
previously, found the independent evidence was inconclusive on the issue of whether the
person who left the vehicle was the driver (R. at 306). It follows that without establishment
of the corpus delicti of either crime, Mr. Hansen cannot be guilty as charged. The circuit
court's conclusion of law is incorrect according to this court's holdings and should be
reversed.
F.

REVIEWING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION UNDER A CORRECTION OF ERROR
STANDARD RESULTS IN REVERSAL

A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness.
Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standard of Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, October
1994, at 9, 23; State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Haves. 860
P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App. 1993). This standard is also referred to as a correction of error
standard, and is defined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994): "Controlling Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of law."
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In Mr. Hansen's case, the trial judge issued his findings of fact and from these
concluded that with the evidence and Mr. Hansen's confession, the state has carried its
burden of proof and Mr. Hansen was guilty as charged (R. at 306). According to the
correction of error standard, this court does not defer to the trial judge's ruling but decides
the matter for itself. In viewing the findings of fact determined by the trial court on remand,
and the holdings of this court on the first appeal, the logical conclusion of law is the vacating
of the convictions. Without Mr. Hansen's statements, the corpus delicti cannot be
established for either crime. The conclusion of the trial court is error and should be
corrected by this court.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hansen respectfully requests the Court of Appeals
reverse the decision of the lower court and vacate Mr. Hansen's convictions, holding the
corpus delicti was not established and therefore, the trial court's conclusion of law on
remand was in error.
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1994.

M

Cleve J. Hatcl
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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record until late 1990 or early 1991. If this
court were to perceive an implied contract
to employ Evans for a definite time period
based upon these representations, then an
employer could never tell a potential employee in a job interview what was expected of him or her over the next few months
or years without creating such a contract.
Implying a contract on this basis would
impermissibly undercut the presumption
that employment contracts are at-will.
Alternatively, even viewing the facts
most favorably to Evans, and assuming
that GTE did promise Evans that he would
not be terminated before the end of 1990
on the basis of inadequate sales, it is important to bear in mind the "narrowness of the
implied-in-fact contract term that [the discharged employee's] allegations would support." Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing
Co., 844 P.2d 303, 307 (Utah 1992). In
Sanderson, plaintiff was allegedly promised that he would not be discharged for
being unable to work due to an illness.
The court noted, however, that the employer "retained his at-will prerogative to fire
Sanderson at any time for any other reason." Id. (emphasis in original). In Evans's case, a promise to give him until late
1990 or early 1991 to close sales would
mean, at most, that GTE could not fire
Evans in the summer of 1990 based solely
upon his sales record. Following the reasoning in Sanderson, Evans could not expand this promise to bar termination on
other grounds, including GTE's decision to
discontinue the IBM program. In all other
respects, the employment relationship between Evans and GTE would remain atwill.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly ruled that no
reasonable jury could find that Evans and
GTE entered into an implied employment
contract for a specified duration of time.
For this reason, we affirm the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to GTE.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David Laird HANSEN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 920823-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 4, 1993.

Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
Circuit Court, American Fork Department
Robert J. Sumsion, J., of leaving scene of
injury accident and driving with suspended
driver's license, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that defendant's postcrime inculpatory statements
were insufficient to establish defendant's
guilt absent any clear and convincing evidence independent of confession that crime
occurred.
Remanded with instructions.

1. Criminal Law <s=>412(6), 535(2)
Postcrime inculpatory statement r :ufficient to establish guilt of defendant only
if there is clear and convincing evidence
independent of confession that crime actually occurred.
2. Criminal Law <£=>563
It is permissible to use reasonable inferences drawn from evidence presented to
establish corpus delicti.
3. Automobiles e=>336
It is not crime for passenger in car
involved in injury accident to leave scene of
accident, although it is crime for operator
to leave. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-29.
4. Automobiles <3=>355(8)
Criminal Law <£=>409(7)
To establish corpus delicti o f J j j j f
meanor of leaving scene of injury acrid**

Utah 979

STATE v. HANSEN
Cite as 857 P.2d 978 (UUhApp. 1993)

state must establish by clear and convincing evidence that person who left scene
^ras in fact driver of vehicle and not merely
passenger, and that evidence may not include defendant's admission of driving.
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-29.
Criminal Law <s=>409(7)
Question of who actually committed
crime may be answered by defendant's admission once corpus delicti is established;
corpus delicti may not be established solely
by defendant's admission. U.C.A.1953, 41^29, 41-6-63.10(2).
5#

g. Automobiles <s=>326
It is not crime to be passenger in car
tfhen one's license is suspended. U.C.A.
1953, 41-2-136, 41-6-44.10.
7. Automobiles <£»326
To show operation of vehicle by person
whose license is suspended, state must
show by independent evidence that driver
of car had suspended license; if state had
shown that both of car's occupants had
suspended licenses, state would necessarily
have shown that one of occupants was driving with suspended license.
8. Criminal Law <£=>412(6)
Once postcrime inculpatory statement
is admitted to establish identity of defendant in one charged crime in which corpus
delicti has already been independently established, statement may then be used to
establish corpus delicti of another crime
involving defendant in same admitted action.
1 Criminal Law <s=>409(6.1, 7)
- 11 defendant's admission that Vie was
driving when accident occurred is determined to be reliable and allowed in as evidence that it was defendant who illegally
*W scene of accident, admission that he
**« driving may then be used to establish
**pus delicti of crime of driving on susIjjGded driver's license; if admission is not
" w e d in on charge of leaving accident,
|**te must produce other independent evi***** that defendant was driving with suss e d license.

Cleve J. Hatch, Provo, for defendant and
appellant.
Benjamin T. Davis, Provo, for plaintiff
and appellee.
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
RUSSON, JJ.
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant, David L. Hansen, appeals his
conviction of a class A misdemeanor for
leaving the scene of an injury accident in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29
(1988), and his conviction of a class B misdemeanor for driving with a suspended
driver's license in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-136 (Supp.1991). We remand
for additional findings.
FACTS
A single-car rollover occurred on September 7, 1991 on Interstate 15. The car
crossed the median, rolled one and a quarter times, and came to rest on the passenger's side. One occupant was pinned beneath the car and suffered fatal head
wounds. Witnesses observed another occupant emerge from the car through the driver's door and then run into a nearby grove
of trees. Witnesses saw him then emerge
from the grove, return to the highway, and
hitchhike away. Before officers arrived at
the accident, bystanders had pushed the
car back to an upright position in an attempt to help the injured occupant. None
of the State's witnesses could say if the
man who left the car was the driver, or if
the man pinned beneath the car was the
driver.
The next day, alter receiving information
from a confidential informant, the police
stopped a vehicle in which defendant was a
passenger. During questioning, defendant
admitted to being the driver in the rollover.
He indicated that he was driving when the
victim, who was very drunk, grabbed the
wheel. Defendant explained that the vehicle rolled when he over-corrected and lost
control. Defendant was charged with leav*
ing the scene of an accident and driving
with a suspended license.
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At trial, defendant moved to dismiss both
charges, claiming the State did not establish the corpus delicti of the crimes by clear
and convincing evidence independent of his
admission that he was driving. The motion
was denied and defendant was found guilty
on both counts. Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court misapplied the corpus delicti rule.

ately return to and remain at the scene
of the accident until he has fulfilled the
requirements of section 41-6-31. The
stop may not obstruct traffic more than
is necessary.
(2) A person failing to stop or to comply
with the requirements of Subsection (\\
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added.)

ANALYSIS

In order for the State to establish the
corpus delicti of the crime specified in section 41-6-29, the State must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the person who left the scene was in fact the
driver of the vehicle and not merely a pag.
senger.1 Such evidence may not include
defendant's admission that he was driving.

Corpus Delicti Rule
[1,2] A post-crime inculpatory statement is sufficient to establish the guilt of a
defendant only when there is clear and
convincing evidence independent of the confession that the crime actually occurred.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150; 1163
(Utah 1991).
An admission or a confession, without
some independent corroborative evidence
of the corpus delicti, cannot alone support a guilty verdict. To sustain a conviction, the requirement of independent
proof of the corpus delicti requires only
that the State present evidence that the
injury specified in the crime occurred,
and that such injury was caused by
someone's criminal conduct.
State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah
1977); see also Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162
n. 8. It is permissible to use reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence presented to establish the corpus delicti. See
State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah
1979).
Leaving the Scene
[3,4] It is not a crime for a passenger
in a car involved in an injury accident to
leave the scene of the accident Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-29 (1988) provides:
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in
an accident resulting in injury to or death
of any person shall immediately stop the
vehicle at the scene of the accident* or as
close to it as possible and shall immedi1. In an attempt to show that a crime was committed, the State improperly asserts for the first
time on appeal that the car crossed the highway
median in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-663.10(2) (1988). The defendant was not so

[5] Defendant argues that the State
must present independent evidence of his
identity as the driver as part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. This assertion is incorrect. "[T]he connection of the accused
with the crime need not be proven to establish the corpus delicti." Knoefler, 663 P.2d
at 176. The question considered when establishing corpus delicti is whether a crime
was in fact committed, not who committed
the crime. See State v. Cazier, 521 ?.2d
554, 555 (Utah 1974); State v. Johnson, 95
Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1938). The
question of who actually committed the
crime may be answered by the defendant's
admission once the corpus delicti is established. Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176.
The record is unclear as to whether the
trial court was convinced that the occupant
who left the accident scene was the driver
based only on the State's independent evidence. There is no express finding by the
trial court that the State had established
the corpus delicti with independent endence, as there should have been once the
issue was raised. The trial court only sfrfr
ed that the "confession puts him in the
driver's seat," and that "the confess!*
makes the difference." From these brirf
charged and this argument was not presented*
trial. Appellate courts will not hear ******!&
are raised for the first time on appealv-^JL
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App.1*1*
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references, it appears that the
^al court may have improperly used defendant's admission to find that the person
who left the scene was the driver of the
car. K this is the case, the trial court
incorrectly applied the corpus delicti rule.
On the other hand, if the trial court was
convinced that it was the driver who left
l^e scene—without relying on defendant's
admission—then the corpus delicti rule was
satisfied. The reference to the confession
putting defendant in the driver's seat
w0Uld relate only to the trial court's determination of who committed the crime, not
the determination that a crime was actually
committed.
The trial court's findings are inadequate
for us to determine on review the steps
taken by the trial court in reaching the
decision it did. We do not know if the trial
court properly found that the corpus delicti
toA been established independent of the
admission. This is a question that must be
resolved at the trial court level. We therefore remand the matter for an explicit determination of whether the corpus delicti of
the crime has been properly established
without resort to defendant's admission.
If the trial court so finds, the conviction
may stand. If not, the conviction should be
vacated.

(3Xa) A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a
vehicle while his license is suspended or
revoked for:
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical
test under Section 41-6-44.10.
(Emphasis added.)2
[7] Since the applicable crime specified
in section 41-2-136 is the operation of a
vehicle by a person whose license is suspended, the State must show by independent evidence that the driver of the car had
a suspended license. Had the State shown
that both of the car's occupants had suspended licenses, then the State would necessarily have shown that one of the occupants was driving with a suspended license
and that the crime was committed by someone. See Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176 (holding that since one of the car's occupants
had to have been driving, and all three
were drunk, then someone must have been
driving under the influence of alcohol).
The State, however, has not asserted here
that both occupants had suspended driver's
licenses.3

[8] Rather, the State asserts that once
a post-crime inculpatory statement is admitted to establish defendant's identity in
Driving on a Suspended License
one charged crime where the corpus delicti
[6] Defendant challenges his conviction has already been independently estabfor driving with a suspended license on the lished, the statement may then be used to
tame grounds. It is clearly not a crime to establish the corpus delicti of another
be a passenger in a car when one's license crime involving the defendant and the same
fc suspended. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-136 admitted action. We agree.
(Supp.1991) provides:
[9] The corpus delicti rule is a "safe(1) A person whose license has been deDifeA, suspended, disqualified or revoked guard against convicting the innocent on
tinder this chapter and operates any mo- the strength of a false confession." Johntor vehicle upon the highways of this son, 821 P.2d at 1162 (quoting State v.
state while that license is denied, sus- Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 375, 314 P.2d 353,
pended, disqualified, or revoked shall be 357 (1957)). The requirement of independent evidence of a crime helps to establish
punished as provided in this section.
is n o
IJJL^*
debate that there is sufficient
dependent evidence that defendant's driver's
^^F-nae had been suspended due to his refusal to
*f*ait to a chemical test under section 41-6-

44.10.

3. An alternative approach to establishing the
corpus delicti of driving with a suspended license would be the typical scenario where the
independent evidence is provided by the arresj^
ing police officer who personally observed the
defendant driving. We have no such eyewitness
evidence in this case.
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the reliability of the inculpatory statement.
Once the reliability of an inculpatory statement has been established, however, the
purpose of the corpus delicti rule has been
satisfied. Therefore, if defendant's admission that he was driving when the accident
occurred is determined to be reliable and
allowed in as evidence that it was defendant who illegally fled the scene of the
accident, the admission that he was driving
may then be used to establish the corpus
delicti of the crime of driving on a suspended driver's license. If, on the other hand,
the defendant's admission is not allowed in
on the charge of leaving the accident scene,
then the State must produce other independent evidence that defendant was driving
with a suspended license. In the latter
scenario, if there is no other independent
evidence to establish the corpus delicti of
the crime, defendant's conviction for driving with a suspended license would have to
be vacated.
Once again, the trial court's findings are
inadequate for us to determine whether the
corpus delicti rule was properly applied.
CONCLUSION
We remand this matter with instructions
that explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law be made as to whether the
State has independently established the
corpus delicti of both crimes.4
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ.,
concur.
(o

I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

4. We note that our remand is not intended to be
a mere bolstering of the trial court's previous
decision. See State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 716
(Utah App.1992). The articulation of findings
of fact and conclusions of law is an integral part
of the decision making process. Adams v.
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 7
(Utah App.1991).
Once [a court] attempts to state its findings,
identify the applicable law, and articulate its
logic, it may discover that critical facts are

The SIERRA CLUB, Utah
Chapter, Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, DIVISION OF SOLID AND
HAZARDOUS WASTE, Respondent,
and
USPCI, Inc., Intervenor.
No. 920485-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 5, 1993.
Environmental group petitioned for judicial review of decision by Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board decision that
application for commercial hazardous
waste incinerator complied with the hazardous waste facility siting criteria and that
the permit application was complete. The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., after raising
standing issue sua sponte, held that: (l)
any standing conferred by stipulation was
lost when issues outside scope of stipulation were raised; (2) environmental group
sustained no distinct injury from alleged
incompleteness; (3) environmental group
was not most appropriate plaintiff; and (4)
review of Board's internal operating procedures did not involve issue of public importance.
Dismissed.
1. Action e»13
Appeal and Error <3=>174
Standing is issue that can be raised
sua sponte at any time, including on appeal.
not properly before it, that the law is od«r
than anticipated, or that its initial logic ii
flawed. In such situations, a result conWJ
to the initial conclusions of the [court! V0f
be dictated.
Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted). It is thus imp*
tive that the trial court fully and property £
evaluate the evidence before it when makiaf<*
requisite findings on remand rather than ffl**v
bolster the previous ruling by summaru^
hearsing the requisite findings.

Tab 2

CLEVE J. HATCH (560 9)
Utah County Public Defenders Association
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone 379-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

DAVID L. HANSEN,

:

A/l/l)

(Zj^/fL

CRAG&$>/£>

Case no. 935007055

Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing on the fifth day of January,
1994 before the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick. The State being
represented by Ben Davis, Deputy Utah County Attorney, the
defendant being represented by Cleve J. Hatch, of the Utah County
Public Defenders Association. After hearing the matter the Court
makes the following Findings of Fact:
The Court finds by clearing and convincing evidence that:
1.

The state has established that an accident occurred.

(Transcript of hearing p. 34. hereinafter T ) .
2.

The state has established that a person involved in the

accident was fatally injured as a result of the accident. (T. p.
34) .
3.

The state has established that an unknown person exited

the vehicle involved in the accident and fled. (T. p. 3 4 ) .
4.

That if there is evidence from any source to establish

that the person who exited the vehicle is the driver, then the
corpus of the crime is established. (T. p. 34 lines 5-8).

5.

The confession of the defendant establishes that he is

the driver. (T. p. 34 lines 8-9).
6.

The court finds that independent of defendants

confession the record is silent on identity

(T. p. 34, line 25

and p. 22 line 10-12, p. 23 line 20-22, p. 24 ) .
7.

The court finds that independent of the defendant's

confession the record is inconclusive on the issue of whether the
deceased was the driver of the vehicle or che person who left the
accident was the driver of the vehicle.(T. p. 24, lines 2-6,
p.23, lines 20-24, t. 30 lines 3-4).
Conclusion of law.
The Court concludes that with the evidence presented along
with the confession of the defendant, the state has carried its
burden of proof.

Therefore the Court finds the defendant guilty

as charged.
Dated this

£?7> day of May, 1994.

Honorable uoseoh I. uimick
^

/
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